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NOTES
Legislation Punishing Drug Use During
Pregnancy: Attack on Women's Rights
in the Name of Fetal Protection
By NANCY K. SCHIFF*
Introduction
Medical science is becoming increasingly aware of how the behavior
of pregnant women affects the developing fetuses they carry. Specifically,
there is increased awareness that a woman's drug use during pregnancy
may directly affect her newborn. 1 These developments have fueled a
legal trend: Pregnant women are being sanctioned, both criminally and
civilly, for behavior believed to be harmful to their fetuses. In an effort to
reduce the number of infants affected by drugs, some state governments
are targeting drug-dependent women for increasingly harsh penalties.
In the last five years, prosecutors have attempted to control wo-
men's prenatal drug use by applying drug trafficking and child abuse
statutes to fetuses as well as to children. Applying the statutes in this
way subjects many mothers of drug-exposed infants to imprisonment or
deprivation of child custody. Prosecutors have achieved only partial suc-
cess, however, in winning convictions through these statutory interpreta-
tions. Several trial courts have refused to define the term "children" to
include fetuses,2 and two trial courts have found criminalization of such
behavior to be an unconstitutional invasion of the women's privacy.'
* B.A., Brown University, 1986; Member, Third Year Class. The author would like to
thank Sandi Levine, Anne Spangler, and Nell Schiff for their assistance.
1. It is estimated that in 1989, 375,000 children in the United States were born with
drugs in their system. NATIONAL AS'N FOR PERINATAL ADDICTION RESEARCH AND
EDUC., A First" National Hospital Incidence Survey, in THE DANGERS OF COCAINE USE IN
PREGNANCY FACT SHEET, Sept. 1989, at 4 [hereinafter NAPARE SURVEY] (on file with the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
2. See, e.g., State v. Carter, No. 89-6274 (Fla. Cir. Ct. (July 23, 1990)); State v. Andrews,
No. JU 68459 (Ohio CL C.P. June 19, 1989); State v. Gray, No. CR88-7406 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
July 13, 1989); In re Torres, No. N-3968/88 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. Oct. 7, 1988).
3. Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); State v.
Bremer, No. 90-3227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991).
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Legislators in some states have responded to these decisions by proposing
legislation of three different kinds: (1) criminalizing the act of giving
birth to an addicted child, (2) forcing health providers to test pregnant
women and newborns for drugs and report the results to law enforce-
ment or child protection agencies, and (3) modifying child neglect stat-
utes to include fetuses as well as children so that behavior during
pregnancy can be used as a basis for terminating maternal custody. In
effect, these statutes recognize the rights of fetuses against the women
carrying them. Commentators have argued that criminalizing the act of
giving birth to an addicted child violates women's eonstitutional rights.4
This Note examines the constitutional and policy implications of the new
testing, reporting, and custody statutes.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the movement for recog-
nition of "fetal rights." This section reviews cases that have been
brought against drug-dependent pregnant women and the difficulties
prosecutors have had in applying existing law to pregnant women's be-
havior in regard to their fetuses. Part II focuses on specific "fetal rights"
legislation that lawmakers have recently proposed or passed into law as a
result of these difficulties, and demonstrates that this legislation violates
women's constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal protec-
tion. Part III argues that the new laws subvert the goal of effective
health care delivery and do not achieve the purported goal of promoting
the health of newborn children. Part IV discusses how the statutes con-
fer legal personhood on the fetus and subordinate the constitutional
rights of women to the perceived needs of fetuses. Finally, the Conclu-
sion proposes that states should focus on approaches that are prevent-
ative and rehabilitative, rather than punitive. A punitive approach
toward pregnant drug users may be attractive in the abstract. A closer
analysis, however, reveals that it provides ineffective protection for the
health of future children at the expense of the constitutional rights of
potential childbearers.
I. "Fetal Rights" History
A. Court-Ordered Medical Intervention During Pregnancy
Advances in medical technology have enabled physicians to learn
about and control the fetus' condition well before birth. As a result,
some obstetricians now view the fetus as a "second patient,"' and some
members of the general public view the fetus as an entity separate from
4. Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal Use of
Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 239 (1990); Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy
Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to
Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (1988).
5. Lawrence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant
Women: Life, Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060, 1061 (19S8).
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the pregnant woman. Some courts have endorsed this view by ordering
pregnant women to undergo medical treatment, including surgery,
against their will when the courts feel the women's medical decisions
improperly protect the fetus' interest.6 As of 1987, eleven courts had
ordered that caesarean sections be performed on women without their
consent.7 In Deaconness Hospital v. McRoberts,' a lower court relied on
a Missouri statute stating that life begins at conception9 to justify order-
ing Ms. McRoberts to undergo a caesarean section against her wishes. In
Jefferson v. Griffln Spalding County Hospital,'° a Georgia court granted
the Department of Human Resources "custody" of Ms. Jefferson's fetus
and ordered her to submit to a caesarean delivery which conflicted with
her religious convictions. The court reasoned that because the "unborn
child" was protected from arbitrary termination of its life by Roe v.
Wade, " the rights of the mother may be subordinated to the needs of the
fetus.12 The Georgia Supreme Court refused Ms. Jefferson's motion to
stay the order.;
13
These decisions depart from the tradition of deference to an individ-
ual's medical choices regardless of the physician's opinion. 4 They also
depart from tradition by compelling an individual to submit to a medical
procedure solely to benefit another. 5 In addition to forcing unwanted
medical treatment on competent adults, these cases prescribe unequal
treatment of women based on race and economic status. A study re-
ported in the New England Journal of Medicine found that poor women
6. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1192 (1987).
7. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights,
10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 11 (1987).
8. No. 874-00172 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1987).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)(2) (1986). This statute provides in pertinent part: "The
general assembly of this state finds that: (1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being .... ." Id. The
constitutionality of this statute was subsequently challenged in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Court held that it need not rule on the constitutional-
ity of this provision because the statute merely expressed the Missouri legislature's value judge-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion. Id at 506-07.
10. 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. 274 S.E.2d at 458.
13. Id. Ms. Jefferson went into labor before the court-ordered surgery was performed.
Although Ms. Jefferson's physician had predicted that the chances of the infant's survival were
only one percent if delivered vaginally, the baby was born alive and healthy. George Annas,
The Most Unkindest Cut of All, 12 HASTiNGS CENTER REP. 16 (1982).
14. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Smith v. Shannon, 666 P.2d 351, 354 (Wash. 1983); Schloendorff v. Society of the New
York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). "[It is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician,
to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie." Canterbury, 464 F.2d
at 781.
15. See Gallagher, supra note 7, at 23-26.
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and women of color were disproportionately subjected to legal interven-
tion in their medical care during pregnancy.
16
One forced-caesarean case was overturned on appeal. In In re
A.C., 7 the lower court ordered, against the family's wishes, that a caesa-
rean be performed on an incompetent, pregnant woman who was dying
of cancer. The court ordered the caesarean section even though the fe-
tus' viability was uncertain and the operation would clearly hasten the
woman's death. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia over-
turned this decision, ruling that the lower court should have considered
what the patient would have decided had she been competent rather than
balancing the rights of the pregnant woman against the interests of the
state.' 8
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitu-
tionality of court-ordered medical treatment of pregnant women. In
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 9 however, the Court upheld the
provision of a Missouri statute which proclaimed that human life begins
at conception. This statute had been the justification for the compelled
caesarean section in Deaconness Hospital v. McRoberts.2" The Court rea-
soned that because the provision merely expresses the Missouri legisla-
ture's value judgement favoring childbirth over abortion, the Court need
not address the provision's constitutionality until a specific application of
it is challenged.2 Thus, it remains undecided whether forcing a preg-
nant women to undergo surgery solely to benefit her fetus violates her
constitutional rights.
B. The "Fetal Rights" Movement in Legal Academia
An emerging movement in legal academia advocates a drastic
change in the legal position of pregnant women. Law Professor John
Robertson proposes that although a woman may abort a fetus, once she
decides to continue the pregnancy, her constitutional rights are dimin-
ished.22 Under his scheme, pregnant women would be subject to govern-
ment control of their medical treatment.23 He proclaims that
16. See Kolder et al., supra note 6, at 1195 (observing that 81% of all court-ordered
medical procedures were performed on women who were African-American, Asian-American,
or Latina).
17. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
18. Id. This decision came too late to help the pregnant woman, who was subjected to the
caesarean operation and died shortly thereafter. Id. at 1237.
19. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506-07.
22. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437 (1983).
23. Id. at 442-43.
a woman has an unrestrained right to control her body until the
fetus reaches viability and then suddenly loses this right once she
decides to carry the child to term. At that point, if the well-being
of the potential child is at stake, she loses her autonomy, and her
body may be invaded and treated for the child's sake.2 4
Philosophy Professor Charles Dougherty proposes that every
human being has a legal right to be born with "sound body and mind"
and a pregnant woman who acts in a way that infringes upon this right
should be held liable.25 He argues that a fetus itself, at any point in its
development, should have a cause of action in tort against its mother for
hazardous activities that she underakes.26
Professor Barbara Shelley advocates not mere civil liability, but
criminal liability for pregnant women's behavior that causes injury to
developing fetuses in order to "to protect and vindicate the interests of
the public as a whole .... ,,27 Thus, in her view, courts should intervene
not only to protect the fetus, but also to prescribe criminal punishment
for a woman who makes unwise decisions about the health of her fetus.
Recently this view has been applied to women who use drugs during
pregnancy.
C. Punishment of Drug Use During Pregnancy Under Existing Statutes
The incidence of babies born with drugs in their system presents a
growing problem. Estimates indicate that in the United States each year,
375,000 children are exposed to drugs before birth.28 Exposure may have
serious physiological effects on the developing fetus, although the effects
vary widely among infants.29 Prosecutors have reacted to the problem
by applying existing criminal and civil statutes to pregnant women.
In some states, prosecutors have criminally charged pregnant wo-
men for use of drugs under drug trafficking statutes that were intended to
apply to delivery of drugs to another human being. For example, in State
v. Black 30 and State v. Johnson,31 Ms. Black and Ms. Johnson were
24. Id. at 463.
25. Charles J. Dougherty, The Right to Begin Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal
Patients and Conflicts with Their Mothers, 63 U. DET. L. REv. 89 (1985).
26. Id. at 115.
27. Barbara Shelley, Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse" The Next Step in the Protec-
tion of Fetal Rights?, 92 DICK. L. RPv. 691 (1988).
28. NAPARE SURVEY, supra note 1. This figure includes exposure to cocaine, heroin,
methadone, amphetamines, PCP, and marijuana.
29. Barry Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants Understanding the Medical Risk, THE Fu-
RE oF CHILDREN, Spring 1991, at 26, 27-29; Barry Zuckerman et al., Effects of Maternal
Marijuana and Cocaine Use on Fetal Growth, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 762 (1989). Some of the
immediate medical effects include impaired fetal growth, smaller head size at birth, id. at 764-
65, and premature birth. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Preg-
nancy: Perinatal Outcome, 261 JAMA 1741, 1742 (1989).
30. No. 89-5325 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 3, 1990).
Fall 19911 DRUG USE DURING PREGNANCY
202 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:197
found guilty of delivering drugs to their infants through the umbilical
cord. Ms. Black is currently serving an eighteen-month prison sentence.
Ms. Johnson appealed, and the court affirmed her conviction but certified
the question to the Florida Supreme Court.32 Thus far, these are the
only such cases to result in convictions.
On the other hand, in State v. Carter,33 the judge dismissed a charge
of delivery of drugs through the umbilical cord, stating that the statute
applied to delivery of drugs to people, not fetuses. 34 The state has filed
an appeal.35 Similarly, in North Carolina, a prosecutor charged a wo-
man with assault with a deadly weapon and delivery of a controlled sub-
stance based upon her drug use during pregnancy.36 The judge dismissed
these charges because "a fetus is not a person" within the meaning of the
assault and drug delivery statutes.31 In Commonwealth v. Pellegrini
38
and State v. Bremer,39 drug distribution charges were dismissed on
grounds that applying the drug distribution statutes to a woman's use of
drugs during pregnancy violated her constitutional rights to due process
and privacy.
Other prosecutors have attempted to penalize pregnant drug users
by characterizing their drug use as criminal child abuse. In Kentucky v.
Welch,4' the court convicted a woman of second-degree child abuse and
sentenced her to five years in prison because her newborn baby suffered
from "neonatal abstinence syndrome"41 as a result of her use of drugs
during pregnancy. Ms. Welch fied an appeal and is awaiting a deci-
sion.42 In Michigan v. Hardy,43 a prosecutor charged a woman with
criminal child abuse and delivery of drugs to a minor because her new-
born infant tested positive for cocaine. A circuit court quashed the child
abuse charge because it found insufficient evidence that the defendant's
ingestion of cocaine while pregnant caused serious physical harm to her
child.' Although Ms. Hardy suffered no criminal penalty, her three
31. No. E89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989).
32. No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991). No decision has been announced
yet.
33. No. 89-6274 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1990), appeal docketed, No. 90-2261 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. (June 4, 1991)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. State v. Inzar, Nos. 90CRS6960, 90CRS6961 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 1991).
37. Id.
38. No. 87970, slip. op. at 9 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990).
39. No. 90-32227-FHI, slip op. at 12-13 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991).
40. No. 90-CR-006 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1990).
41. For a description of this medical condition, see Stephen R. Kandall, Neonatal Drug
Abstinence, in PEDIATRICS § 15.2.14 (Abraham M. Rudolph ed., 18th ed. 1987).
42. Welch v. Kentucky, No. 90-CR-006 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1991).
43. No. 89-2931-FY (Mich. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 5, 1989).
44. Id. Although the court denied defendant's motion to quash the drug delivery charge,
a Michigan Court of Appeals later reversed, reasoning that the legislature did not intend the
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children were placed in foster care while her case was pending.
In State v. Gethers4' and State v. Andrews,' each court held that its
state's existing child endangerment statutes did not apply to women's
prenatal drug use. The Andrews court considered but rejected the argu-
ment that the woman's privacy rights would be violated by such a
charge.47 A conviction under a child endangerment statute was over-
turned in State v. Gray48 because the Court of Appeals found that the
statute did not apply to the "passage of harmful substances from a
mother to her child in the brief moments from birth to the severance of
the umbilical cord." The Ohio Supreme Court has agreed to hear the
state's appeal. The only state supreme court to address this question is
Wyoming's, which concluded thirty-eight years ago that the state's child
abuse statute was not intended to apply to fetuses.49
States have also tried to discourage drug use during pregnancy by
taking custody of children whose mothers used drugs while pregnant. In
both In re Baby X, 50 a Michigan case, and South Dakota v. Christensen,51
the state took custody of infants because they were born with traces of
illegal drugs in their systems. Even though the mother in Christensen
successfully completed a drug treatment program, the judge will neither
let her resume custody of her child nor permit her to visit her child. 2
Three women in South Carolina also lost temporary custody of their in-
fants based on positive drug tests."3 In In re S. W.,s4 a California court
separated a mother from her children because she had abused drugs dur-
ing her most recent pregnancy, even though she had made every effort
possible to obtain treatment for her addiction and could prove her will-
ingness and competence to take care of her children. In In re Troy D .,1
a California Court of Appeals held that the presence of drugs in an in-
fant's system and his mother's previous loss of custody of a child due to
drug delivery statute to apply to a pregnant woman's ingestion of drugs. State v. Hardy, No.
128458 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1991).
45. No. 89-4454CF10A (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 1989).
46. No. JU 68459 (Ohio Ct. C.P. June 19, 1989).
47. Id.
48. No. L-89-239, slip. op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1990).
49. State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469, 474-75 (Wyo. 1954).
50. 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
51. No. CRI 90 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 1990).
52. Lynn Paltrow & Suzanne Shende, American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Free-
dom Project Memorandum, State by State Case Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Against
Pregnant Women and Appendix of Public Health and Public Interest Groups Opposed to These
Prosecutions (May 21, 1991) [hereinafter Case Summary] (on file with the Hastings Constitu-
tional Law Quarterly).
53. Ellen Goetz et al., American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Freedom Project
Memorandum, Poor and Pregnant? Don't Go to South Carolina... (Feb. 1, 1990) (on file with
the Hastins Constitutional Law Quarterly).
54. No. J-17240 (Cal. Cir. Ct. 1987).
55. 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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drug use provided suffcient evidence to support a dependency petition
removing the infant from his mother.5 6
Some courts have terminated custody for the mother's use of sub-
stances other than illegal drugs. In In re J Jeffrey,57 a child was taken
away several months after birth based on his mother's alleged use of
valium, a legal painkiller, during her pregnancy, even though the mother
was drug-free at the time of the custody hearing. The mother had no
history of neglect of her other two children. Yet an entire year passed
before she was allowed to resume custody of her infant.5 8
At least some courts, however, are unwilling to extend the definition
of child neglect to drug-dependent pregnant women. In In re Torres 9
and In re Sharon Fletcher,6° family courts in New York, holding that a
determination of child neglect could not be based on prenatal drug use by
the mother, refused to terminate custody. 1
Some states have approached the problem of drug addicted babies
by legally detaining pregnant women to protect their fetuses. In South
Carolina, a woman was placed under house arrest for the duration of her
pregnancy based on a single, positive drug test.62
This approach has not always succeeded. In Ohio, for example, a
court of appeals overturned a juvenile court order placing a pregnant
woman in a "secure treatment facility" to protect the woman's fetus from
her alleged drug use. The court of appeals held that the juvenile court
had no jurisdiction over an adult woman to control her behavior during
pregnancy.63 Notably, the decision rested on the jurisdictional issue and
not on the constitutional argument made by defense counsel that such an
order infringed the woman's right to liberty.6 Judge Whiteside, in his
concurrence, expressed his disappointment that the General Assembly
had "not yet enacted law dealing with the rights of unborn children."
65
By expressing his concern for statutory fetal rights, Judge Whiteside im-
plied that a woman's liberty interest should not prevent the involuntary
detention of pregnant women who use drugs.
56. Id. at 877.
57. No. 99851 (Mich. Ct. App. filed Apr. 9, 1987).
58. The President's National Drug Abuse Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environmen4 House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
26 (1990) (statement of Lynn Paltrow, Kary Moss, and Judy Crockett on behalf of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union) [hereinafter Hearing].
59. No. N-3968/88 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Oct. 7, 1988).
60. 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1988).
61. The court in In re Sharon Fletcher stated that "[i]t is the Commissioner's burden to
prove that any prior drug use puts the child in danger now." Id at 243 (emphasis added).
62. Case Summary, supra note 52, at 12.
63. Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 88AP 856 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1988).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11.
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Pregnant women are also subject to discriminatory sentencing by
judges. Rather than being placed on probation, which is the usual sen-
tence for forging checks, Brenda Vaughn, a pregnant woman, was sen-
tenced to prison because a drug test indicated she was using cocaine.66
Vaughn was never formally charged with illegal drug use and received no
trial. The judge justified the sentence as necessary to protect Vaughn's
fetus,67 and explained that some of his fellow judges had similarly sen-
tenced pregnant women who were drug abusers.68
Thus far, courts have responded unpredictably to the question
whether existing statutes should apply to fetuses, which the Supreme
Court has ruled are not "persons" under the Constitution.69 Defense
lawyers argue that extending statutes beyond their precise language and
beyond the intentions of the legislators violates due process because wo-
men have no notice that drug delivery and child abuse statutes apply to
prenatal behavior.70 They also argue that these prosecutions and custody
terminations violate women's constitutional rights to privacy and auton-
omy. 71 Among all the decisions favoring the mother, however, only two
rested on the mother's constitutional rights of privacy and autonomy.72
The other decisions rested on the basis that fetuses were not within the
definitions in the statutes as written.
II. Legislative Trend Toward Protection of "Fetal Rights"
The reluctance of courts to accept distorted interpretations of stat-
utes to punish pregnant, drug-addicted women has prompted some
lawmakers to propose legislation that expressly punishes these women.
66. United States v. Vaughn No. F-2171-88B (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988).
67. Id.
68. Id. Illinois, Minnesota, and Delaware have recently enacted statutes allowing such
special penalties to be imposed for drug use during pregnancy. Dawn Johnsen, From Driving
to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 179, 194-95 n.52 (1989).
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
70. Appellant's Initial Brief at 36-39, Johnson v. State, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
Apr. 18, 1991); Defendant-Appellee's Brief on Appeal at 16-18, State v. Hardy, No. 1288458
(Mich. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 5, 1989); Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Welch v. Kentucky, No. 90-
CCR-006, (Ky. Ct. App. (Sept. 11, 1991)).
71. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 25-26, State v. Gray, No. L-89-239 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 31, 1990) (prosecution for criminal child endangerment); Appellant's Initial Brief at 40-
49, Johnson v. Florida, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991) (prosecution for deliv-
ering drugs to a minor); Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioners' Motion for Leave to
Appeal to the New York Court of Appeals at 11, In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280
(1990) (action to terminate custody).
72. See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No: 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); State v.
Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991). Although the family court in In re
Sharon Fletcher, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1988), based its dismissal of the child neglect claim on
statutory construction, it also acknowledged that "[b]y becoming pregnant, women do not
waive the constitutional protections afforded to other citizens." Id. at 243.
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The legislation generally falls into one of three categories: (1) criminal-
ization of the act of giving birth to an addicted child, (2) requirement
that health care personnel test pregnant women for drugs and report test
results or behavior to the government, and (3) removal of children from
their mother's custody due to the mother's behavior during pregnancy.
A. A New Crime is Proposed: Giving Birth to a Drug-Addicted Child
Legislators in four states have proposed legislation that would make
it a felony to give birth to a drug-addicted child. None of the proposed
legislation was passed into law. A Georgia bill would have sentenced a
first offender to one to ten years imprisonment, and a second offender to
two to twenty years.73 In Louisiana, the bill proposed that violators be
"imprisoned at hard labor for not more than ten years or fined not more
than fifteen thousand dollars, or both."'7 4 These sentences are much
more severe than those typically imposed for drug trafficking
convictions.
75
Ohio's proposed legislation would have classified the offense as an
"aggravated felony of the second degree" and prescribe the potentially
harshest penalties of all the bills:
If the woman previously has not been convicted of or pleaded
guilty to a violation.., the court shall sentence the woman to elect
to do one of the following[:] a) successfully complete a drug addic-
tion program; b) undergo a tubal ligation; c) if available, partici-
73. The bill provided in relevant part:
(a) Any person who uses a controlled substance . . . or a dangerous drug,...
while pregnant and who as a result of such use gives birth to a child who at the time
of birth tests positive for addiction to a controlled substance or a dangerous drug
shall be guilty of the offense of distributing a controlled substance or a dangerous
drug to an unborn child.
(b) Any person who violates subsection (a)... shall be guilty of a felony and...
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.
Upon a first conviction... the judge may probate the sentence; and such probation
may be upon the special condition that the defendant undergo a mandatory period of
counseling administered by an approved substance abuse treatment program or
agency.... Upon a second or subsequent conviction of such offense, the defendant
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years nor more than 20
years.
H.B. 1146, 127th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., 1990 Georgia.
74. The bill provided in relevant part:
A. It is unlawful for a woman to give birth to an infant who is addicted to heroin or
cocaine as the result of the mother's use of such substance during her pregnancy....
B. Whoever violates this Section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more
than ten years or fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars, or both.
H.B. 603, Reg. Sess., 1990 Louisiana.
75. For example, federal sentencing guidelines prescribe a sentence of two to eight months
imprisonment for a first or second offense of possession or trafficking involving 50 to 200 grams
of hashish. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL 73, 242 (West 1991). The guidelines prescribe a sentence of six to twelve months for
a first or second offense involving 200 grams of hashish. Id.
[Vol. 19:197
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pate in a five-year program of monitored contraceptive use
approved by the court that the court has determined is completely
reliable and can be monitored effectively, and during the five-year
period abstain from the addictive use of drugs of abuse.76
Although this proposal offers the woman three options, she would
have little real choice. Option c) specifies no particular contraceptive
method. Currently available contraceptive methods are not "completely
reliable" in preventing pregnancy.77 The most reliable method, the re-
cently introduced Norplant implant, is expensive and more physically
intrusive than any other method because it requires implantation under
the woman's skin." The Norplant implant also poses serious health risks
to the woman if inserted improperly.79
The monitoring required under this option would be difficult, partic-
ularly if the contraceptive method required the woman to take a particu-
lar action daily, such as taking a birth control pill. If the court
determines that no method is "completely reliable" and able to be moni-
tored, or if the method chosen by the court requires an intrusive medical
procedure, to which the woman does not wish to submit, the woman
would have to choose between only the first two options.
The option of drug treatment may be ineffective as well, because the
woman would satisfy the condition only if she is successful in treatment.
If her drug-addiction problem is not cured through participation in the
program, she would be left with only the second option of tubal ligation.
Tubal ligation is an intrusive surgical procedure that permanently pre-
vents her from bearing children and affects her overall health.
In addition, the bill does not specify what would happen if the
agency has no funds available to pay for a particular woman's treatment.
The legislation provides that the county's board of alcohol, drug addic-
tion, and mental health services should bear the cost of treatment for
indigent women. However, the funds allocated to any agency by the
state government are limited. Evidently, a woman who is not able to
afford the substantial cost of drug treatment would be forced to choose
the option of tubal ligation.
According to the proposed statute, if a woman is convicted more
than once of giving birth to a drug-addicted infant, the option of entering
a drug-treatment program would be eliminated. 0 Again, since moni-
76. S.B. 324, 118th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., 1989-1990 Ohio.
77. ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 1990 TO 1992, at 134
table 8:2 (15th rev. ed. 1990).
78. Id. at 304-05.
79. Id.
80. The proposed statute provides in pertinent part:
(2) If the woman previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a viola-
tion of division (A) of this section, the court shall sentence the woman to elect to do
one of the following and to act in accordance with the election: undergo a tubal
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tored contraception may be unworkable due to limited contraceptive
technology, the woman would be forced to undergo a tubal ligation.
Although this legislation was not approved by Ohio's Health and Human
Services Committee in 1990, Senator Cooper Snyder, the bill's author,
intends to introduce a similar bill in the future."1
In Colorado, a legislator unsuccessfully proposed amending the defi-
nition of criminal child abuse to include abuse of a controlled substance
during pregnancy.82 The bill's author plans to introduce this legislation
again in the future.8 3 Similarly, former United States Senator Pete Wil-
son unsuccessfully attempted to prevent any state from receiving grants
for prenatal health care unless the state made giving birth to a drug-
addicted baby a felony punishable by at least three years in prison."
Bills creating this new type of crime have not become law in any state,
but they continue to be introduced and debated.
B. Pregnant Women Lose Their Right to Privacy in Their Medical
Treatment
1. Testing and Reporting Statutes
Other, more successful, legislative proposals require health profes-
sionals to detect and report drug or alcohol use by pregnant women.
Some recent fetal abuse cases were initiated when health care providers
reported pregnant women whom they suspected of drug use to law en-
forcement agencies.85 Some lawmakers believe that detection and report-
ing should be mandatory. For example, in Minnesota, a new law
requires that a physician administer a toxicology test to a pregnant or
ligation; if available, participate in a five-year program of monitored contraceptive
use approved by the court that the court has determined is completely reliable and
can be monitored effectively, and during the five-year period abstain from the addic-
tive use of drugs of abuse.
S.B. 324, 118th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., 1989-1990 Ohio.
81. Telephone interview with Amy Brooks, Aide to Ohio State Senator Snyder (Nov. 15,
1990).
82. H.B. 90-1170, 57th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Colorado. This bill would
amend the definition of child abuse to include "[a]ny case in which a child is born with medical
evidence of exposure to any controlled substance... or any case in which a child is born with a
serious physical impairment due to any such controlled substance." Id. at 20.
83. Telephone interview with Colorado State Representative Phil Pankey (Nov. 19, 1990).
84. S. 1444, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
85. State v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), was initiated when a
physician reported a pregnant woman to law enforcement agencies for "child" abuse after the
woman admitted to him during treatment that she had used cocaine during her pregnancy.
A health worker in California tested a new mother for drugs solely because the woman
had not received prenatal medical care, and reported the positive test results to child protec-
tion authorities. This led to an action to terminate the woman's custody of her children. In re
Troy D., No. D008442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The woman challenged the action on grounds of
breach of confidentiality, but was unsuccessful. In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989).
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postpartum woman if there are any medical indications that the woman
might have used drugs during pregnancy." The mother's consent is ir-
relevant. If there is any evidence of drug use, the physician must report
the test results to the local welfare agency. 7 This agency is required to
notify the local law enforcement agency.8
Other recent legislation does not mandate drug testing but requires
that health care workers report to the government results of tests or sus-
picions concerning drug use by pregnant or postpartum women. A re-
cently passed Oklahoma law requires that medical personnel, under
threat of criminal penalty, report a woman who gives birth to a drug-
dependent child to the Department of Human Services. 9 That Depart-
ment is in turn required to report the results of an investigation to law
enforcement agencies.' ° A similar bill considered, but rejected, by the
Missouri legislature would have required any medical practitioner who
has "reasonable cause to suspect" the use of a controlled substance by a
pregnant woman to report the woman to the Division of Family Serv-
ices. 91 This Division would have been required to report the information
86. A physician shall administer a toxicology test to a pregnant woman under the
physician's care or to a woman under the physician's care within eight hours after
delivery to determine whether there is evidence that she has ingested a controlled
substance, if the woman has obstetrical complications that are a medical indication of
possible use of a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West Supp. 1991).
87. A person mandated to report under section 626.556, subdivision 3, shall immedi-
ately report to the local welfare agency if the person knows or has reason to believe
that a woman is pregnant and has used a controlled substance for a nonmedical
purpose during the pregnancy.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1991).
88. "The local welfare agency, upon receiving a report, shall immediately notify the local
police department or the county sheriff orally and in writing." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556
(West Supp. 1991).
89. Every physician or surgeon ... or any other health care professional attending
the birth of a child who appears to be a child born in a condition of dependence on a
controlled dangerous substance shall promptly report the matter to the county office
of the Department of Human Services in the county in which such birth occurred.
Provided it shall be a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly and willfully fail to
promptly report any incident as provided above.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1991).
90. "[I]f the county office finds evidence of abuse and neglect [it shall] forward its findings
to the district attorney's office.,.." Ide
91. When any [medical practitioner or child care worker] has reasonable cause to
suspect that a child has been or may be subjected to abuse or neglect or observes a
child being subjected to conditions or circumstances which would reasonably result
in abuse or neglect, including the use of a controlled substance by a pregnant woman
for a non-medical purpose, he shall immediately report or cause a report to be made
to the division [of family services] ....
S. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri.
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to the appropriate law enforcement agency.92 Likewise, an amendment
to a Utah statute adds "fetal alcohol syndrome" to the list of conditions
that health care workers must report, under threat of criminal penalty, to
social service agencies, 93 and requires that the social service agency re-
spond to the report by investigating for possible child abuse. 94
Each of these enacted or proposed statutes imposes on medical per-
sonnel and institutions a duty to "police" their patients. Both the
Oklahoma and Utah statutes enforce this duty by imposing criminal pen-
alties on health care workers who fail to comply. 95 Physicians in all
states currently have a duty to report instances of child abuse.96 The new
requirements, however, impose the additional duty to conduct tests for
the presence of drugs in a woman's bloodstream, or to report confidential
medical information, even if there is no evidence of child abuse.
Even without these types of statutes, some hospitals have mandated
their own testing procedures. According to Dr. Wendy Chavkin, most
hospitals screen newborns for the presence of illegal drugs when mater-
nal drug use is suspected, but there is no specified criteria by which phy-
sicians are to decide whether such a test is appropriate.97 Although a
single, positive toxicology screen does not indicate the extent of drug
use,98 Chavkin observes that hospitals interpret it as evidence of repeated
illicit drug use by the mother.99 Strict reporting statutes, particularly
those that impose criminal penalties for failure to report, put pressure on
92. "Upon receipt of a report .... the local [family services] office shall contact the
appropriate law enforcement agency.. . ." Id. The bill did not become law because the Senate
Health Committee failed to vote on it before the end of the legislative session.
93. When any person. . . attends the birth of a child or cares for a child, and
determines that the child, at the time of birth, has fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal
drug dependency, he shall report that determination to the division as soon as
possible.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-504 (1988).
Any person, official, or institution required to report a case of suspected child
abuse, neglect, fetal alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug dependency, who willfully fails
to do so is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-511 (1988).
94. The division shall make a thorough investigation upon receiving either an oral or
written report of alleged abuse, neglect, fetal alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug depen-
dency, when there is reasonable cause to suspect a situation of abuse, neglect, fetal
alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug dependency.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-509 (1991).
95. See supra notes 89, 93.
96. John E.B. Myers, A Survey of Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Statutes, 10 J. Juv.
L. 1, 1 (1986).
97. Hearing of House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of Wendy Chavkin, M.D., M.P.H.).
98. Judith Larsen et al., Medical Evidence in Cases of Intrauterine Drug and Alcohol Ex-
posure, 18 PEPP. L. Rnv. 279, 285 (1991).
99. Hearing of House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, supra note 97, at 3.
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health care workers and institutions and may encourage the widespread
adoption of practices similar to those observed by Chavkin.
Although the new testing and reporting requirements are purport-
edly designed to help children,"°° in reality they focus on identifying wo-
men who use drugs or alcohol, as opposed to identifying children who
are at risk for future abuse by their parents. Because the Constitution
protects individuals from unjustified governmental actions, these statutes
are only permissible if the governmental interest they seek to protect out-
weighs the individual interests at stake. The next section of this Note
evaluates the testing and reporting statutes in light of specific constitu-
tional provisions and concludes that pregnant women suspected of drug
use do not receive the protections traditionally guaranteed by the
Constitution.
2. Constitutional Arguments Against the New Testing and Reporting
Requirements01
a. Protection from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures of their person or property by the federal govern-
ment,"0 2 and has been applied to the individual states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. °3 This protection ensures that the government does
not arbitrarily invade citizens' privacy and security."° As the Supreme
Court stated in Schmerber v. California, 105 "The integrity of an individ-
ual's person is a cherished value of our society."106
This protection applies if a police officer wishes to search a person or
area for evidence of a crime. Before searching, the officer must first ob-
tain a warrant based on "probable cause" that evidence of a particular
crime will be found."0 7 A vague suspicion is not sufficient: the officer or
prosecutor must present specific facts supporting the suspicion in order
to receive permission to conduct a search.108 She must present this infor-
mation to a "neutral and detached magistrate" for detefnination of
probable cause. 109
100. For example, the Minnesota reporting statute declares "that the public policy of this
state is to protect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse,
neglect, or sexual abuse." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 1991).
101. This Note analyzes the statutes' compliance with the United States Constitution and
not compliance with each state's constitution.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
103. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
104. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989).
105. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
106. Id at 772.
107. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 (1971).
108. Id.
109. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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A compulsory urine or blood test constitutes a search of one's per-
son,110 and therefore must be evaluated under the above standards. In
Minnesota, health care personnel are required to test any woman, during
pregnancy or immediately after childbirth, who has any medical compli-
cation that indicates "possible" drug use during her pregnancy.' No
warrant is required. Health care workers decide who should be tested
based on indications of "possible" drug use. "Possible" cause replaces
"probable" cause, providing pregnant women with less protection than
non-pregnant criminal suspects.
The government may search permissibly without first obtaining a
warrant under some limited occasions when exigent circumstances ex-
ist."I2 The search, however, must be based on a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing." 3 The Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California found
that a compelled blood test of a drunk-driving suspect satisfied the prob-
able cause requirement." 4 Although the officer did not have a warrant,
the suspect had caused a serious traffic accident and exhibited numerous
symptoms of drunkenness, providing probable cause to arrest."15 In
Mincey v. Arizona,"6 however, the Court ruled that the occurrence of a
homicide in a person's home was insufficient to justify a four-day war-
rantless search of the home.
The state may assert that its interest in law enforcement provides
the exigent circumstances that allow a search without a warrant. Be-
cause neither ingestion of drugs nor addiction to drugs is a crime, these
searches would not be based upon reasonable suspicion that evidence of a
crime will be found. If a state were to make drug use during pregnancy a
crime, and require testing and reporting based on indications that this
crime had been committed, suspicion of a specific crime would exist.
Physicians and other health care workers would make a legal determina-
tion as to whether it is reasonable to conduct the procedure against the
wishes of their patient. Thus, permission to conduct a search would not
be subject to approval by a neutral and detached magistrate.
The Supreme Court has also established an exception to the usual
warrant requirement when the government has a "special need" beyond
law enforcement." 7 In New Jersey v. T.L.0., 11 for example, junior high
school officials were permitted to search a student's purse based on only
110. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (urine test);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (blood test).
111. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West Supp. 1991).
112. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 768-69.
115. Id.
116. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
117. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
118. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
"reasonable suspicion" as opposed to "probable cause" because officials
had a special need to protect the safety of the entire student popula-
tion. 119 In Bell v. Wolfish, 2 the Supreme Court upheld the body search
of prison inmates without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
The Court relied on the inmates' severely diminished expectation of pri-
vacy and the importance of safety concerns in the uniquely dangerous
environment of a prison.
121
Pregnant women in Minnesota are treated as a special category of
people whose privacy interests may be invaded, as were the students in
T.L. 0. and the prison inmates in Bell. Adult pregnant women, however,
can be readily distinguished from these groups. Prison inmates have di-
minished privacy rights because they have been convicted of a crime, and
junior high school students are children whom the school has a legal
duty to protect.
These tests require many pregnant women to undergo blood testing
in order for the government to identify the few drug-using women. Ad-
vocates of compelled blood testing without warrants received some sup-
port for their position in two recent Supreme Court decisions. In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 122 and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab,'23 government agency regulations com-
pelling drug testing without a warrant or individualized suspicion were
upheld as not violative of the Fourth Amendment. Skinner and Von
Raab departed from precedent by allowing searches based merely on a
low level of individualized suspicion. 12 4 The regulations at issue in both
cases, however, differ significantly from legislation targeting pregnant
women. The regulations upheld in Skinner mandate blood testing of rail-
road employees who are working when a serious train accident occurs.125
The regulations provide for drug testing only in very specific circum-
stances: if there is reasonable suspicion that an employee's acts contrib-
uted to an accident, evidence that specific rules were violated, and
observation of impairment by two supervisors.' 26 The Court held that
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing was not necessary in these cir-
cumstances because of the significant public safety interest advanced by
119. Id at 341.
120. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
121. Id. at 558-60.
122. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
123. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
124. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Von Raab, noted that previously the Court had upheld
body searches without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing in only one case, Bell v. Wofish.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
558-60 (1979)). In Bell, the Court upheld body searches of prison inmates after contact with
visitors, relying on the unique safety needs of a prison setting. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979).
125. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
126. Id. at 611.
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the drug-testing requirement and because the employees' privacy interest
was diminished because they had willingly assumed employment in a
heavily regulated industry.
127
Unlike the railroad workers in Skinner, pregnant women targeted by
fetal rights legislation have not entered into employment that is regulated
pervasively by the government, and thus have no diminished expectation
of privacy. In contrast to the public safety interest in Skinner, the pur-
ported interest advanced by Minnesota's forced testing statute is the fe-
tus' safety. In addition, in contrast to the specification of when testing is
required in the Skinner regulations, under the Minnesota statute, medical
professionals have wide discretion in determining which women must un-
dergo testing. 128
A state may argue that it has a special need to prevent child abuse
which justifies intrusive behavior. The special need to protect children,
although significant, is not served by a requirement of testing all women
suspected of using drugs while pregnant. A toxicology test reveals only
whether the woman has ingested drugs recently.' 29 It does not indicate
how often the woman ingests drugs, whether the drug use has actually
damaged her fetus,13 or whether the woman is likely to abuse her child.
Although a woman's prenatal drug use may directly affect her fetus, the
woman's drug use has no direct effect after the child's birth. Therefore,
compelled blood testing does not serve to protect children.
Statutes forcing medical personnel to disclose patients' medical in-
formation implicate an additional aspect of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion: the "right of the people to be secure in their ...papers and
effects." '3 The Supreme Court has held that an area is protected from
an unreasonable search if an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area.' 32 People have a reasonable expectation that their
medical records will be kept confidential, and thus medical records gen-
erally should be protected from disclosure to the government. A Califor-
nia court supported this view in Wood v. Superior Court,'33 holding that
"good cause" was required for issuance of subpoenas for examination of
medical records. The new statutes in Minnesota"3 and Oklahoma
35 and
the proposed statute in Missouri' 36 force health care workers to ignore
127. Id. at 627-28.
128. Under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West Supp. 1991), a health professional is
required to test any woman who exhibits "any medical indication" of possible drug or alcohol
use during pregnancy.
129. Larsen et al., supra note 98, at 285.
130. Id.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. 212 Cal. Rptr. 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
134. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1991).
135. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1991).
136. S.B. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri.
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the traditionally confidential nature of medical records whenever the pa-
tient is a pregnant woman.
States may assert a number of reasons to justify this intrusion. The
government may claim that reporting by physicians is justified by the
need to protect third persons, that is, the need to protect children from
abusive parents. 137 The reporting requirements, however, identify only
women who have had a single, positive drug or alcohol test, as opposed
to identifying children who are being abused or are at risk for future
abuse. The statutes do not address the actual level of harm suffered by
the fetus or newborn child. No evidence indicates that a woman who
uses drugs during pregnancy is more likely to neglect her child in the
future.131 In addition, because toxicology tests are not absolutely accu-
rate,139 some women will be falsely accused. The risk of false accusation
is even greater under a proposed law in Missouri that would require a
health care worker to report mere suspicions without performing a drug
test.1
40
All states currently have child abuse reporting statutes. These stat-
utes require health care workers and other professionals to report their
belief that a child is in danger of abuse by her parents.14 ' In contrast, the
new statutes require reporting women based on their drug use alone and
not on the harm they have caused or risk of harm they pose to their
child. Existing child abuse reporting statutes serve the state interest in
identifying children at risk for abuse. Therefore, additional reporting re-
quirements based on maternal drug use are not justified.
State governments may also assert their interest in law enforcement
to justify the intrusion.' 42 Drug or alcohol use is not a crime, however.
Moreover, drug or alcohol use by pregnant women does not by itself
constitute criminal child abuse in any of the states with prenatal drug use
reporting statutes. Therefore, the only law enforcement purpose served
by the reporting requirements is enforcement of drug trafficking laws.
Even if enforcement of these laws is a proper goal, pregnant women do
not receive the same right to a confidential relationship with their doctor
as non-pregnant patients.
137. See supra note 100.
138. Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return
to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REv. 745, 763-71 (1990).
139. Larsen et al., supra note 98, at 284.
140. S. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri; see supra note 91.
141. Myers, supra note 96.
142. The Minnesota reporting statute originated in the Judiciary Committee of both houses
of the Minnesota legislature and was passed as part of the Omnibus Crime Bill, a bill "relating
to crime." See Judith M. Nyhus Johnson, Minnesota's "Crack Baby"Law: Weapon of War or
Link in a Chain?, 8 L. & INEQUALITY 485, 491 (1990). The Oklahoma reporting statute is
part of Title 21, entitled "Crimes and Punishments." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West
1991).
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Compelled blood testing compromises women's bodily integrity and
intrudes on the intensely personal relationship between patient and doc-
tor in deciding matters of the patient's medical care. Mandatory report-
ing exposes women's personal medical information. Traditionally, the
Fourth Amendment has protected citizens, pregnant or not, against un-
reasonable invasions of their privacy and bodily integrity. If the
Supreme Court continues to erode the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, however, and statutes requiring increased monitor-
ing are enacted, all pregnant women may be at risk for unjustified
intrusions.
b. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has found a fundamental right to privacy im-
plicit in the Constitution.143 In Whalen v. Roe,"4 the Supreme Court
recognized that the right to privacy includes a patient's interest in keep-
ing her medical information private. The Supreme Court in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 4 ' acknowledged
the private nature of one's reproductive health information when it
struck down statutory provisions requiring physicians to report informa-
tion about women seeking abortions.
Like the statutes struck down in Thornburgh, the proposed report-
ing legislation interferes with a woman's right to privacy. The right to
privacy is fundamental.146 Therefore, the proposed statutes are constitu-
tional only if they are justified by a compelling state interest and employ
means which are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.147
States may assert a strong governmental interest in identifying chil-
dren who are at risk for abuse by their mothers. 14 Even if this interest is
considered sufficiently compelling to override the woman's privacy right,
mandatory reporting of results of drug tests is not narrowly tailored to
achieve this goal. The statute in Minnesota 4 9 and a proposed statute in
Missouri, 150 require a single, positive toxicology test to be reported to the
government. In Minnesota a health care worker is required to report a
woman who exhibits a medical indication of possible drug use even with-
out performing a toxicology test.' 5 ' A woman who used drugs during
143. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that there is a zone of privacy
emanating from the protections of the Bill of Rights which includes the right of married per-
sons to use contraceptives).
144. 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
145. 476 U.S. 747, 765-67 (1986).
146. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
148. See supra note 100.
149. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1991).
150. S. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri.
151. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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her pregnancy, even if only once, is thus treated as though she is more
likely to abuse her child after birth. Data show, however, that women
who use drugs during pregnancy are not more likely than other women
to abuse their children once they are born. 5 2 Reporting to authorities
may result in criminal prosecution of the woman or termination of cus-
tody, neither of which serves the interest of the child in most cases. 153 In
addition, health care workers may report women falsely due to inaccu-
rate test results or mistaken suspicions. States can more effectively and
less intrusively identify children at risk by enforcing existing child abuse
reporting statutes that require health care workers to report parents who
are abusing their children or not caring for them properly. 5a
Five states have classified drug use during pregnancy as per se
"child abuse."' 55 Thus, in those states, doctors must report drug use
under the existing child abuse reporting laws. In these cases, the state
allows the interests of the fetus to outweigh the mother's right to privacy
in medical treatment. The fetus is treated as though it were already a
child with rights independent of the woman carrying it.
Roe v. Wade "I held that fetuses do not have legal status as persons
under the Constitution.157 Roe also held, however, that the state has an
interest in potential life which may become compelling after the fetus
reaches viability, so that at this stage the interest in the fetus may take
precedence over the woman's rights. 58 Thus, states may be able to regu-
late women later in pregnancy without violating the Constitution. The
new reporting requirement in Minnesota and the proposed requirement
in Missouri, however, apply to a woman's drug use at any point in the
pregnancy,15 9 including pre-viability. The Court in Roe established that
a woman's right to privacy encompasses the right to terminate her preg-
nancy before the fetus is viable, reasoning that at this stage the state's
interest in the fetus' well-being is not compelling."6° Roe also required
that the severity of the intrusion be balanced against the level of harm
sought to be prevented by the intrusion.161 These statutes, however, do
not consider the frequency of the woman's drug use or actual harm suf-
fered by the fetus.
152. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 138.
153. See infra Part I.
154. See Meyers, supra note 96 and accompanying text.
155. These states are Indiana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Minnesota. See infra Part
III.C. 1.
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157. Id. at 157-58.
158. Id. at 163-64.
159. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1991); S. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly,
2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri.
160. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
161. Id. at 155.
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The statutes subordinate the woman's right of privacy in her medi-
cal treatment and records to the fetus' right to be protected from possible
harm. Moreover, they are not narrowly tailored to achieve the purported
goal of protecting the health of children. These statutes diminish the
liberty of all pregnant women by disregarding Roe and elevating the legal
status of fetuses.
c. Equal Protection
Because these statutes expressly apply only to women, they impli-
cate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
requires equal treatment under the law for all citizens.162 Laws that treat
people differently because of their gender require strong justification.163
In Craig v. Boren,' the Supreme Court declared that legislation which
discriminates by gender must be subject to an intermediate level of judi-
cial scrutiny. 6 ' Under this level of scrutiny, it is not enough that gender
based legislation relate in a rational way to a legitimate goal of govern-
ment. Rather, the Equal Protection Clause demands that differential
treatment based on gender serve an important governmental interest and
be substantially related to that interest.
66
The proponents of fetal rights legislation assert that encouraging the
birth of healthy children is an important state interest and that this inter-
est is served by regulating pregnant women's behavior. Although the
birth of healthy children is indisputably an important societal interest,
holding only women responsible for harm to this interest is unjustified
discrimination. Scientific studies have demonstrated that men contribute
directly to the future health of their children in many ways. A fetus is
more likely to be born with low birth weight if a man smokes 67 or drinks
alcohol' 68 before the fetus is conceived. Low birth weight babies much
more frequently experience certain severe health difficulties after birth.'
69
If a man uses cocaine, a child he fathers is more likely to have develop-
mental disabilities. 70 Yet, the statutes do not require physicians to test
162. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
163. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
164. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
165. Id. at 197.
166. Id.
167. Fetuses Weigh Less If Father Smokes, NEW ScIENTIsT, Aug. 28, 1986, at 19.
168. Ruth Little et al., Association of Father's Drinking and Infant's Birth Weight, 314
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1644 (1986); Rita Robinson, High-ProofPaternity, HEALTH, June 1988, at
20; Andrew Purvis, The Sins of the Fathers, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 90.
169. Michael Lewis & Margaret Bendersky, Cognitive and Motor Differences Among Low
Birth Weight Infants Impact of Intraventricular Hemorrhage, Medical Risk, and Social Class,
83 PEDIATRICS 187, 187 (1989).
170. Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Sper-
matozoa 266 JAMA 1956 (1991).
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sexually active men for drugs and to report their test results or suspected
drug or alcohol use to the government. If a man batters a pregnant wo-
man, serious injury to the developing fetus can result."' Yet no in-
creased penalty is imposed on a man who intentionally harms the fetus in
this way. Although a significant number of women who were arrested
for their drug or alcohol use during pregnancy had been physically
abused by the father of the child, none of these men have been charged
with child endangerment.' 72 Likewise, a person who sells drugs to a
pregnant woman does not receive an increased penalty because his drug
trafficking harmed the fetus.
The birth of healthy children is an important concern. Sincere con-
cern for fetal health, however, would dictate that fetus-endangering be-
havior of women and men be punished equally. Burdening only women
is not substantially related to the goal of protecting children, and there-
fore the new testing and reporting statutes violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause also guards against racial discrimina-
tion by the government. 173 Government action that distinguishes be-
tween people based on race is subject to a strict level of judicial
scrutiny.174 Although the fetal rights statutes are racially neutral on
their face, racial discrimination in their application may be
unconstitutional.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 175 the Supreme Court held that although the
language of a statute may be impartial, administration of a statute in a
racially discriminatory manner violates the Constitution. 176 A recent
Florida study concluded that although Caucasian women and African-
American women engaged in similar levels of cocaine use during preg-
nancy, African-American women were reported to health authorities at
approximately ten times the rate of Caucasian women. 177 This indicates
that racial bias was a factor in the decision to report.
Two obstacles may thwart an Equal Protection challenge to this
practice, however. One obstacle is that constitutional protections apply
171. Linda F. Bullock & Judith McFarlane, The Birth-Weight/Battering Connection, 1989
AM. J. NURSING 1153.
172. The President's National Drug Abuse Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-5 (1990) (statement of Lynn Paltrow, Kary Moss, and Judy Crockett on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
175. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
176. Id. at 373-74.
177. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy
and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1202 (1990).
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only to government action, 178 and the physicians who decide which wo-
men to test under the statute may be private physicians. The Supreme
Court considered a claim that constitutional rights were implicated when
physicians used statutory guidelines to decide in which medical facilities
Medicaid patients should be treated. The Court held that the action of
the physicians was not state action. "[A] State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." 
179
Another obstacle is the requirement of showing intent to discrimi-
nate either by the legislators enacting the statute180 or by those who en-
force the statute.'81 No evidence demonstrates that the fetal rights
statutes were enacted or are enforced with racially discriminatory intent.
A challenge to the reporting statutes on the basis of racial discrimination
in their application would succeed only if the physicians are considered
state actors and if some evidence of intentional discrimination can be
uncovered. 1
82
Some legislators have attempted to curb drug use during pregnancy
by mandating blood testing and reporting of prenatal drug use. These
new approaches provide ineffective protection for children's health and
178. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1688 (2d ed.
1988).
179. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
180. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
181. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
182. It is possible, however, that the recent criminal prosecutions of pregnant women
under drug delivery laws described in Part I.C, supra, violate the Equal Protection Clause. A
study conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union revealed that 80% of the prosecutions
for drug use during pregnancy were brought against African-American women. Lynn Paltrow
et al., ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project Memorandum, Overview ofACLU National Sur-
vey of Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women: 80% Brought Against Women of Color
(Oct. 3, 1990) (on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly). Evidence shows, how-
ever, that African-American women are no more likely to engage in illicit drug use during
pregnancy than Caucasian women. See Chasnoff et al., supra note 177; Interim Hearings on
Parental Substance Abuse and Its Effects on the Fetus and Children Before the California Legis-
lature, Senate Select Subcomm. on Substance Abuse at 8 (Oct. 24, 1988) (testimony of Xylina
Bean, M.D.) [hereinafter Interim Hearings on Parental Substance Abuse], cited in Jacqueline
Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use The Dangerous and Unequal Use of Punitive Measures, 2
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 239, 243 (1990). Although in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944),
the Court ruled that discriminatory application of a neutral statute violates the Constitution
only if "intentional or purposeful," id. at 8, the interpretation of "intentional" and "pur-
poseful" is unclear. WAYNE R. FAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.4(d) (1985). Professors LaFave and Israel argue that the Equal Protection Clause should
apply to a district attorney or police officer who exhibits racial bias in enforcement of the law
even without conscious intent to discriminate. Id. Professor Dorothy E. Roberts argues con-
vincingly that the Equal Protection Clause should apply to discriminatory prosecution of preg-
nant African-American women. Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies"
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. Rnv. 1419, 1450-56 (1991).
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compromise women's rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and equal
protection.
C. Separating Drug-Dependent Women from Their Children
1. Changes in Custody Laws
Another legislative response to the problem of drug-exposed infants
has been separation of drug-dependent women from their children. Indi-
ana,'1 3 Nevada,'" and Oklahoma'85 have expanded their definitions of a
neglected or abused child to include newborns who exhibit symptoms of
fetal alcohol syndrome or drug addiction. The legislatures in Dela-
ware186 and Missouri 8 7 considered, but did not vote on, similar
proposals.
Some states have amended their statutes even further. In Illinois,
for example, a newborn is now considered "neglected" if her blood or
urine contains any amount of a controlled substance, whether or not the
infant exhibits any effects of exposure to the substance. l8  Minnesota
also changed its definition of neglect to include prenatal exposure to a
controlled substance.'89 A newborn may be considered neglected if a
positive toxicology test is performed on the mother at delivery, even if
the infant shows no indications of exposure."9 An Arizona State Repre-
sentative proposed an almost identical measure 9' as part of the Omnibus
183. This statute provides: "A child is a child in need of services if. (1) The child is born
with: (A) Fetal alcohol syndrome; or (B) An addiction to a controlled substance or a legend
drug .... " IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3.1 (1990).
184. This statute provides: "1. A child is in need of protection if: . (.. b) He is suffering
from congenital drug addiction of the fetal alcohol syndrome, because of the faults or habits of
a person responsible for his welfare .... " NEv. REV. STAT. § 432B.330 (1989).
185. OmrA STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(4) (1990).
186. H.B. 416, 135th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Delaware.
187. S.B. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri. This bill provides:
[N]eglect also includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance... used by the
mother for a non-medical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms in the
child at birth, results of a toxicology test performed on the mother at delivery or the
child at birth, or medical effects or developmental delays during the child's first year
of life ....
Id
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3 (1989). The presence of an illegal substance in an
infant at birth indicates only that the mother ingested the substance recently, but not that the
infant suffered any effects.
189. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 1991). This statute provides:
Neglect includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance... used by the mother
for a nonmedical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms in the child at
birth, results of a toxicology test performed on the mother at delivery or the child at
birth, or medical effects or developmental delays during the child's first year of life
that medically indicate prenatal exposure to a controlled substance.
I.d
190. Ia4
191. This bill provided:
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Child Protection Act. However, the legislature removed this measure
before it approved the Act.
A proposed Colorado bill would have amended the definition of
criminal child abuse to include giving birth to a drug-addicted child.192
The bill did not become law in the 1990 session of the legislature but its
author plans to reintroduce the bill.193 A Hawaii bill provided that chil-
dren have a right to be born drug free, and that a mother who gives birth
to a second drug-exposed child could lose custody of all of her chil-
dren.194 The bill was defeated in the 1990 session.
Some of these new statutes have already had an effect. For example,
the new definition of child abuse in Indiana led to State v. Yurchak.' 95 In
this case, hospital officials reported a baby's cocaine addiction to welfare
agencies, which notified the police.1 96 The police then charged the wo-
man with possession of cocaine.
1 97
When a woman is charged with child abuse or neglect, the state
removes her children from her custody immediately. Children are usu-
ally separated from their mothers the entire time a case is investigated,
and women often have difficulty regaining custody of their children even
if they are cleared of the charges.198 The fetal rights statutes presume
that these women are unfit parents. They shift the focus from the
mother's desire and ability to care for the child to the mother's behavior
before the child was born.
The proposals to change custody laws, whether successful or not,
illustrate the growing trend toward protection of fetuses at the expense of
the women carrying them. 99 The next section of this Note evaluates the
constitutionality of the changes in custody laws and argues that this
trend jeopardizes the rights of all women who are potential child bearers.
Abuse.includes exposure to a controlled substance used by a mother for a nonmedi-
cal purpose, as medically indicated by withdrawal symptoms in the child at birth or
results of a toxicology test performed on the mother at delivery or the child at birth.
H.B. 2690, 39th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Arizona.
192. H.B. 90-1170, 57th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Colorado; see supra note 82.
193. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
194. H.B. 3219, 15th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Hawaii.
195. No. 64D01-8901-CF-181B (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 2, 1989) (decision pending).
196. Telephone interview with Patrick Young, attorney for defendant Brenda Yurchak
(Jan. 14, 1991).
197. Id
198. See supra notes 51-52, 57-58 and accompanying text.
199. A related bill which did not pass in the Alaska legislature in 1990 provided that "a
person may be committed to the custody of a private or public facility by the superior court" if
"the person is an alcoholic who habitually lacks self-control in using alcoholic beverages and
... the person is pregnant and, unless committed, is likely to harm the fetus by continued use
of alcohol ..... " S.B. 414, 16th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Alaska. Rather than
assisting the woman to overcome her alcoholism so that both she and any children she bears
will be healthy, this legislation would merely prevent her from drinking while she is physically
connected to a fetus.
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2. Constitutional Arguments Against the New Custody Statutes
a. Procedural Due Process
A parent's right to raise her children constitutes a fundamental lib-
erty interest protected from government interference by the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 'o Before the government intrudes on a protected liberty
interest, it must satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.2"1
Santosky v. Kramer 2 established that before irrevocably terminating
parental rights, the state must satisfy due process by proving by clear and
convincing evidence that a parent is unfit.2"3 In Stanley v. Illinois,2' the
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois law denying all unmarried fathers
custody because they were presumed to be neglectful parents. A state
may not presume that each member of a certain class of people is unfit to
be a parent.20 5
The new statutes in Illinois,2 6 Indiana,20 7 Nevada,203 and
Oklahoma,' 9 as well as the proposed legislation in Arizona,21 0 presume
that a woman who uses drugs or drinks alcohol during pregnancy is unfit
to care for her child. A mother's drug or alcohol use after the child's
birth does not harm the child in the same direct way that it might before
birth. Therefore prenatal behavior can be the basis for termination of
custody only if it constitutes clear and convincing evidence that the wo-
man will harm her child in other ways. Studies have provided no evi-
dence that mothers who used drugs during pregnancy will be abusive.211
A woman's opportunity to form an emotional bond with her infant in the
first month of life is important for the child's development.21 2 Although
women accused of abuse will eventually resume custody of their children
if they are judged to be fit parents, even a short separation is a serious
intrusion on parental rights.
The severity of terminating child custody necessitates a hearing on a
woman's fitness before any separation from her child. As the Supreme
Court stated in Santosky v. Kramer,2" 3 "[T]he fundamental liberty inter-
200. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
201. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
202. 455 U.S. at 745.
203. Id. at 747-48.
204. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
205. Iad at 657-58.
206. ILL. REV. STAT ch. 37, para. 802-3 (1989); see supra note 188 and accompanying text.
207. IND. CODE § 31-6-4-3.1 (1990); see supra note 183.
208. Nnv. REV. STAT. § 432B.330 (1989); see supra note 184.
209. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1101(4) (1990); see supra note 185.
210. H.B. 2690, 39th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Arizona; see supra note 191.
211. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 138, at 763-71.
212. BOBBY CREw & RuTH G. MULLINS, GROwTH AND DEVELOPMENT: A PRIMARY
HEALTH CARE APPROACH 219-20 (1982); GEORGE H. LOWREY, GROWTH AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF CHILDREN 136-39 (7th ed. 1978).
213. 455 U.S. at 745 (1982).
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est of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents
.... "214 Separating mothers from their children for any length of time
without a hearing, based only on the mothers' use of drugs, violates their
rights to procedural due process.
b. Equal Protection
These statutes expressly apply only to women. Given this, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that they satisfy an intermediate level
of judicial scrutiny.2 15 Although only women become pregnant, ample
evidence demonstrates that drug and alcohol abuse by men jeopardize
the health of fetuses they father.216 Yet no legislator has proposed classi-
fying this behavior as child abuse or separating drug using fathers from
their children. No legislator has suggested imposing criminal sanctions
on men. Thus, the current approach burdens women unequally.
c. Right to Privacy
The new child neglect statutes also implicate women's fundamental
right to privacy.217 The Court has described this right in terms of auton-
omy: it includes the "interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions." '218 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,2" 9 the Supreme Court
held that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses a person's deci-
sions about whether or not to procreate. A state must justify any inva-
sion of this fundamental right by asserting a compelling governmental
interest and by demonstrating that the particular invasion is necessary to
protect that interest.221 In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,2 1
the Supreme Court struck down statutes mandating a particular length
of pregnancy leave that a woman must take from her employment. Ac-
cording to the Court, this would penalize a woman for her decision to
reproduce.222
The aforementioned fetal protection statutes similarly abridge wo-
men's right to reproductive freedom. Under these statutes, a pregnant
woman with a drug problem must choose to either terminate her preg-
nancy or suffer criminal or civil punishment. Forcing the woman to
abort her pregnancy to avoid punishment impermissibly burdens her fun-
damental right to make the decision whether or not to bear children.
214. Id. at 753.
215. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
216. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
217. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
218. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
219. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
220. 429 U.S. at 599-600.
221. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
222. Id. at 640.
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Another aspect of the fundamental right to privacy is the right to
control the upbringing of one's children.22 These statutes deny the wo-
man this right because a child is removed immediately from a mother
who tests positive for drug use. Furthermore, the state removes the child
without an investigation into the mother's fitness as a parent. Immediate
removal deprives the mother and child of the opportunity to establish the
emotional bond necessary for the child's early development.224 Courts
should balance such a severe burden against the governmental interest at
stake.
States may claim that the interest in the welfare of children is a
sufficiently compelling governmental interest to justify this burden. The
removal statutes, however, are not narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.
None of these statutes considers the level of harm suffered by the new-
born infant. None of them considers the current ibility of the mother to
care for her child. Under the Minnesota statute, even if a woman over-
comes her addiction early in her pregnancy and her infant is born drug-
free, the woman's drug use early in her pregnancy nevertheless could
constitute child neglect.22 The statute's focus is on the woman's behav-
ior during pregnancy rather than the child's welfare. Some experts be-
lieve that in many cases separating children from their parents is more
harmful than the risk of physical harm, and recommend keeping families
together if at all possible.226 These statutes infringe women's right to
raise their children without achieving the purported goal of protecting
children.
In states that have classified drug use during pregnancy as "child"
abuse, it can be argued that the states' interest is the fetus itself and that
therefore the states place the interest of the fetus above the woman's right
to privacy. The Supreme Court in Roe said, "we do not agree that, by
adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant
woman that are at stake." 2 7 The Court, however, distinguished between
the government's interest in potential human life at different stages of
pregnancy. The Court held that before the fetus is viable, the woman's
right to reproductive autonomy outweighs the state's interest in the well-
being of the fetus.228 Thus, a woman may terminate her pregnancy dur-
223. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children allowed to leave school
after eighth grade because of parents' religious beliefs); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (parents have the right to determine what kind of school their children
attend); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (parents have a right to control what lan-
guages their children learn to speak).
224. See CREW & MULLINS, supra note 212.
225. The Minnesota statute provides that "[n]eglect includes prenatal exposure to a con-
trolled substane .... " It does not specify when in the woman's pregnancy the exposure must
occur. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
226. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
227. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
228. It at 163.
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ing this period.22 9 But after the fetus is viable, the state has a compelling
interest in protecting "potential life" which must be weighed against the
privacy interests of the pregnant woman.
In Minnesota, however, a woman may violate the statute if she uses
drugs in the early days of her pregnancy before she knows she is preg-
nant.230 In that case the fetus is the object of the government's interest,
not only before it is born, but even before it is viable. Advocates of this
type of fetal rights legislation challenge the current legal doctrine de-
lineating a woman's legal rights in relation to her fetus.
States can protect future children through less intrusive and more
effective means. In fact, the measures pursued thus far have not pro-
tected children.231 The most direct way to protect the health of the fu-
ture child of a drug-addicted woman is to provide the woman with
effective drug treatment services before, or at least during, pregnancy. 2
To protect children from abuse without unnecessarily separating chil-
dren and their mothers, the court should order an in-depth investigation
into the mother's fitness before an infant is taken from her. Drug treat-
ment and other necessary services should be provided before removal. In
these ways states can pursue the important goal of protecting the welfare
of children without intruding impermissibly into the reproductive auton-
omy of women.
Legislators who change the definition of child abuse and neglect to
include prenatal drug use shift the focus from the mother's desire and
ability to care for the child to the mother's behavior before the child was
born. The new laws violate women's rights to procedural due process,
equal protection, and reproductive autonomy. Moreover, this approach
fails to achieve the goal of improving children's health. Public policy
concerns alone provide a strong argument against the punitive approach
embodied in the new custody, testing, and reporting statutes.
M. Public Policy Arguments Against the New Testing,
Reporting, and Custody Laws That Recognize Fetal
Rights
Despite the assertion of fetal rights proponents that healthy children
are their primary concern, their punitive approach toward pregnant wo-
men and new mothers fails to prevent the birth of drug-addicted
newborns. The few reports of decreases in the numbers of drug-addicted
229. Id
230. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991); see supra note 225.
231. See infra Part III for a discussion of this point.
232. This approach is not only less intrusive, but cost effective. A recent study concluded
that prevention and treatment programs would cost significantly less than caring for drug-
addicted babies. Ciaran S. Phibbs et al., The Neonatal Costs of Maternal Cocaine Use, 266
JAMA 1521, 1526 (1991).
newborns have been linked to preventative approaches, such as public
education, rather than punitive ones.2 33 Increased efforts to monitor and
punish pregnant women who use drugs, and to separate drug-using
mothers from their children, hinder effective health care and divert atten-
tion and resources from preventative measures that would benefit chil-
dren in the long term.
Prenatal health care is an extremely important contributor to fetal
health, especially for drug-dependent women.234 Providing prenatal care
and helping drug- or alcohol-abusing women to abstain during preg-
nancy significantly reduces the risk of damage to the newborn.235 For
many women, lack of adequate prenatal care is more detrimental to the
health of the developing fetus than the mother's use of drugs during
pregnancy.236 The threat of being reported to law enforcement officials
or losing custody of children deters women from seeking prenatal care
and treatment for their addiction.237 Fear of legal repercussions causes
women who do seek prenatal health care to conceal important informa-
tion from their doctors, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of their
treatment.238
Those who advocate helping babies by punishing drug-addicted wo-
men either ignore or do not recognize that drug addiction is a physical
disease influenced by genetic and environmental factors beyond the suf-
ferers' control. 9 Sufferers need treatment to overcome the loss of con-
trol they experience over their own behavior.2' Those who blame
women for failing to overcome their addiction ignore the lack of drug
treatment programs, especially those that accept pregnant women.241
Even the available treatment programs are not always effective for drug
233. News Broadcast, KQED radio, June 3, 1991.
234. S.N. MacGregor, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Correlation Between Prenatal Care
and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 882 (1989).
235. Ira Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 261 JAMA 1741,
1744 (1989).
236. Taxpayers Pay for Lack of Prenatal Treatment, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 3,
1986, at 713.
237. Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical
Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264
JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990); Kary L. Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing of Postpartum Women
and Newborns as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406,
1411-12 (1990).
238. Carol Gentry, Angry Doctors Cut Drug Tests After Police Interview Moms, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 1989, at lB.
239. Cole, supra note 237, at 2667. A recent study demonstrated a connection between
mental illness and drug and alcohol addiction. Karen Klinger, Mental Illness Linked to Drug
AlcoholAbuse, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 21, 1990, at B1.
240. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 166 (3d ed. rev. 1987); see also supra note 237, at 2667.
241. S.F. WEEKLY, June 26, 1991, at 7; Karol L. Kumpfer, Treatment Programs for Drug-
Abusing Pregnant Women, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1991, at 50, 53.
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abusing pregnant women; many of the programs focus on the needs of
male patients and not on the unique social and emotional needs of preg-
nant women.242
These obstacles to curbing the problem of drug use during preg-
nancy will not be overcome by punishing pregnant women for their
problems. A punitive attitude toward drug-addicted pregnant women
prevents effective health care for the mother and fetus, making the birth
of a healthy baby even less likely. Statutes penalizing one-time drug use
may actually discourage a woman from seeking the drug treatment that
would benefit her fetus. Once the mother has used drugs, she will be
penalized even if she subsequently overcomes her drug addiction.
Imprisonment of pregnant women also makes the birth of a healthy
baby less likely because the poor living conditions and inadequate health
care in prison jeopardize the health of the woman and her developing
fetus.2 43 Numerous medical associations recognize that punitive meas-
ures are detrimental to women and children and have denounced them
publicly.
244
Similarly, fetal rights laws that impose obligations on health care
professionals to police patients are unproductive because the laws com-
promise the professionals' ability to provide effective and compassionate
health care. Physicians might be obligated under the new statutes to re-
port women to authorities for one-time drug use. However, they proba-
bly would not want the women to be sent to prison where they would
receive inadequate medical attention. Physicians would also know that
reporting deters women from pursuing desperately needed health care.
Moreover, to provide effective care, a physician needs to encourage pa-
tients to discuss all health problems, including drug use, candidly and
completely. A duty to report women who use drugs may discourage this
necessary discussion. Under the Minnesota statute,24 5 which requires re-
porting of positive toxicology test results, physicians may forego poten-
tially useful tests in order to avoid having to report patients. On the
242. See Cole, supra note 237, at 2669; Lisa Leff, Treating Drug Addiction with the Woman
in Mind, WASH. POsT, Mar. 5, 1990, at El; Kumpfer, supra note 241, at 55. Drug-abusing
women tend to experience lower self-esteem and greater anxiety and depression than men.
Kumpfer, supra, at 55. Research has concluded that 80% to 90% of female drug abusers and
alcoholics were victims of rape or incest. Leff, supra. These different characteristics necessi-
tate different types of therapy. Kumpfer, supra, at 55.
243. Ellen M. Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 189 (1989); see also,
Ellen M. Barry, Quality of Prenatal Care for Incarcerated Women Challenged, YOUTH LAW
NEws, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 1.
244. Some of these groups are the American Public Health Association, the American So-
ciety of Law and Medicine, the American Society of Addiction Medicine, the American Medi-
cal Association, and the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and
Education. See Case Summary, supra note 52, at 16-17.
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other hand, laws such as those proposed in Oklahoma2" and Utah,24 7
establishing criminal penalties for a health professional's failure to report
suspected pregnant drug-abusers, might encourage physicians to be over-
zealous in their procedures and test all women. The reporting statutes
force doctors to choose between their duty to the patient and their duty
to the government.
Removing newborns from their mothers' custody temporarily or
permanently is also counterproductive. It prevents the necessary emo-
tional bonding between infant and mother in the first few months of the
infant's life.2 48 Children who are removed from their mothers are usu-
ally placed in an institution where they receive little personal atten-
tion.249 One commentator argues that long-term foster care can cause
lasting psychological damage.2 0 A child's interest in being cared for by
her own parents, although not accorded the status of a fundamental con-
stitutional right, should be given serious weight by legislators when they
determine the criteria for termination of parental custody. Even tempo-
rary removal, in the absence of evidence of actual abuse, does not serve
the interests of either parents or children. Although drug-dependent wo-
men need help to overcome their addiction, most succeed in treatment
and are willing to care for their infants.
Fetal rights statutes also ignore social and economic conditions that
contribute to the health problems of newborn children. Studies reveal
that many diverse aspects of the woman's life and environment contrib-
ute to the health of her child.2"' Specifically, exposure of either the male
or the female to various toxic substances before conception can cause
serious damage to children they conceive. 252 One study demonstrated
that financial hardship is a greater contributor to low birth weight of
newborns than illegal drug use by a pregnant woman.253 Low birth
246. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1991); see supra note 89.
247. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-504 (1988); see supra note 93.
248. See CREw & MULLINS, supra note 212.
249. Hearing of House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (statement of Wendy Chavkin, M.D., M.P.H.).
250. Douglas Besharov, How Child Abuse Programs Hurt Poor Children: The Misuse of
Foster Care, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 218, 222 (1988).
251. Irving Emanuel et al., Poor Birth Outcomes of American Black Women: An Alterna-
tive Explanation, 1989 J. Pun. HEALTH PoL'Y 299. This study concluded:
It appears that the mother's own intrauterine life and her childhood may be impor-
tant predictors of future reproductive health. If this is so, it is unlikely that subop-
timal reproductive health can be completely corrected by focusing only on what
transpires during the nine months of a woman's pregnancy and delivery.
Id. at 302-03.
252. See, eg., Effects of Perinatal Exposure to PCBs, 261 JAMA 3214 (1989); Andrew
Purvis, The Sins of the Fathers, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 90.
253. Donald B. Binsacca et al., Factors Associated With Low Birthweight in an Inner.City
Population: The Role of Financial Problems, 77 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 505, 506 table 2 (1987).
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weight is the single most important contributor to neonatal deaths.254
Poor women who lack adequate nutrition and prenatal health care have a
much higher rate of infant mortality than do middle and upper class wo-
men.255 States have not responded by providing adequate prenatal care
to all who need it.
The new statutes are explicitly gender biased. Only women's per-
sonal habits in relation to reproduction are scrutinized. Although only
women bear children, men contribute substantially to the health of fe-
tuses and children. Before conception, the potential father's exposure to
cocaine, cigarettes, alcohol, or chemicals damages his sperm and can cre-
ate serious health risks and developmental problems in the newborn. 256
Men who batter their pregnant partners endanger maternal and fetal
health.257 Men who abandon their pregnant partners leave them emo-
tionally and financially vulnerable, risking the health of the fetus. Ad-
mittedly, only recently has the public become aware of some of the ways
that the behavior of fathers affects fetuses. Nevertheless, with our cur-
rent knowledge there is no justification for recognizing the rights of fe-
tuses only in relation to their mothers and ignoring the fathers'
contribution to the health of babies.
Application of the reporting statutes has exhibited both racial and
class bias. A recent study demonstrates that African-American women
are almost ten times as likely as Caucasian women to be reported to au-
thorities, although there is no difference between the level of drug use by
each group.25 Since more Black women are poor and receive no prena-
tal health care, medical personnel using the lack of prenatal care as a
criteria for drug testing are likely to report more Black women to law
enforcement authorities. The discretion given to health care profession-
als to test and report based on "suspicions" or "indications" of drug use
allows racism to influence their decisions.259 Class or cultural biases may
also influence custody determinations.26 One commentator has noted
254. Emanuel et al., supra note 252, at 299.
255. Binsacca et al., supra note 254; Antonovsky, Social Class and Infant Mortality, 11
Soc. SCIENCE MED. 453 (1977); Celia W. Dugger, Cocaine Use and Infant Mortality Decline
Together in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, at 1.
256. See notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
257. Bullock & MeFarlane, supra note 171; Family Violence Project Fact Sheet (on file
with the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly).
258. See Chasnoff et al., supra note 177; Interim Hearings on Parental Substance Abuse,
supra note 182, at 8.
259. Professor Dorothy Roberts argues that the historical devaluation of African-Ameri-
can women as mothers underlies the trend toward punishing drug dependent women. Roberts,
supra note 182, at 1436-50.
260. As the Supreme Court observed, "[B]ecause parents subject to termination proceed-
ings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups ... such proceedings are often
vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
763 (1982).
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that courts and social services agencies remove children from their
homes more often because of deprivation attributable to poverty rather
than because of physical abuse.26'
Contrary to the alleged purpose of these new policies, increased
monitoring, punishment, and deprivation of custody have not resulted in
healthier children. There is reason to question whether the health of
children is the only, or even the most important, purpose behind these
policies. First, expressions of concern for fetuses are ironic when one
considers that some of the statutes give no attention to the actual level of
harm or risk to the born child. The Minnesota laws and the proposed
law in Missouri require a woman to be reported for drug use regardless
of the condition of her infant.262 In Illinois, any amount of drugs in an
infant's system at birth constitutes neglect.263 In Minnesota, proof that
the infant was exposed to drugs at any time during pregnancy, even if the
infant is completely unaffected at birth, constitutes neglect. 2 Second, as
demonstrated above, there are more effective ways to combat the prob-
lem of drug-addicted babies. Sincere concern for babies should lead
states to provide drug treatment and health care services to pregnant wo-
men. Third, our government has demonstrated insufficient concern for
the needs of children after they are born. Most state welfare programs
provide insufficient funds for women to obtain prenatal health care and
for mothers to feed and care for their children.265 These factors indicate
that underlying the new policies is the fetal rights advocates' desire to
control women's behavior and punish them for failing to live up to soci-
ety's idea of a good mother. The current trend toward recognition of
fetal rights focuses on only one factor contributing to children's health
rather than addressing the enduring societal problems that continue to
harm children.
IV. Giving the Fetus the Status of Constitutional Personhood:
Subordination of Women's Constitutional Rights
Although evidence demonstrates that a punitive approach has been
ineffective, fetal rights advocates persevere in their quest to create legal
duties owed by the pregnant woman toward her fetus. Lawmakers are
allowing speculation about future harm to an entity that does not yet
have sufficient independent legal rights to justify intrusions into the preg-
nant woman's rights to privacy, autonomy, due process, and equal pro-
261. Besharov, supra note 250, at 219.
262. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West Supp. 1991); S. 756, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d
Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri.
263. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 37 para. 802-3 (1989).
264. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (West Supp. 1991).
265. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 26-7, 29, 31,
37 (1991).
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tection. The new statutes treat fetuses, in some eases nonviable fetuses,
as legal entities whose needs take precedence over the constitutional
rights of women.
The Supreme Court has declared that a fetus is not a "person" for
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life, liberty
and pursuit of happiness. 66 The Court also recognized, however, that
the state has an interest in potential life which is to be weighed against
the woman's autonomy rights.267 Fetal rights advocates weigh these
rights and conclude that the rights of the fetus should take precedence.
The current trend toward creation of fetal rights has the potential to
lead to unprecedented governmental intrusion. First, the proposals are
not limited to protection of fetuses that are viable. Recently passed or
proposed laws apply to a woman's behavior in her early months of preg-
nancy, before the fetus is able to survive outside the pregnant woman.268
Second, fetal rights proposals are not limited to prohibition of illegal
behaviors. Women already have been sanctioned for legal behavior dur-
ing pregnancy. In In re J Jeffrey,269 the state took custody of a child
several months after birth based on his mother's alleged use of valium, a
legal pain-killer, during her pregnancy, even though the mother was
drug-free at the time of the custody hearing.270 Recently enacted statutes
in three states apply to women's use of alcohol during pregnancy.271 Fe-
tal rights advocates and some judges have noted with approval the poten-
tial for extending fetal rights laws to other behaviors that might result in
a less-than-perfect child.2 72 Professor John Robertson suggests the fol-
lowing standard for pregnant women in their first trimester:
When she is undecided [whether or not to abort her pregnancy],
... she should have a duty to avoid the harmful activities in case
she decides not to abort. Similarly, she should be penalized for
failing to use a fetal therapy before viability, so that the infant will
be healthy if she decides to go to term. If she does not want the
therapy, her choice will be to abort or to risk the penalty.... If she
has reason to know she is pregnant-if, for example, she has been
sexually active and has missed a period-but she has not yet had
her pregnancy confirmed, it does not seem unreasonable to require
266. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
267. Id.
268. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.556, 626.5561 (West Supp. 1991); S. 756, 85th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., 1990 Missouri.
269. No. 99851 (Mich. Ct. App. filed Apr. 9, 1987).
270. See Hearing, supra note 58, at 26.
271. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (West Supp. 1991), NEv. REV. STAT. § 432B.330
(1989), UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4-504, 62A-4-509 (1991).
272. See Emily M. Dargatz, Legal Representation of a Fetus: The Mother and Child Disu-
nion?, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 591, 602 (1989); Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights
of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 81, 83, 89 (1984); Michele Magar, The Sins of the Mothers,
STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1991, at 30.
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her either to have a pregnancy test or to refrain from activities that
would be hazardous to the fetus if she were pregnant. 73
Many activities may be hazardous to the fetus. If a woman has rea-
son to believe she is pregnant, she may have to avoid, among other
things, smoking cigarettes, drinking alcoholic beverages, undergoing
medical X-rays, exercising too little or too much, improper nutrition, fly-
ing in airplanes, prescription drugs, and sexual activity. Professor Mar-
gery Shaw argues that maternal duties in early pregnancy should include
"regular prenatal checkups, a balanced diet with vitamin, iron, and cal-
cium supplementation, weight control, and judicious use of medications,
tobacco, and caffeine."'274 Taken to their logical extension, fetal rights
policies could force a woman with medical conditions such as AIDS,
cancer, or epilepsy to have an abortion because the condition, or drugs
taken to combat or control the condition, are likely to harm the fetus.275
If a woman is to be held accountable for every activity during her entire
pregnancy, she must accept severe limitations on her personal autonomy
in order to bear and raise children. Women already have been forced to
undergo state-ordered caesarean sections in order to procreate.
2 7 6
Women may be pregnant without knowing it. Under the fetal rights
advocates' line of reasoning, all women of childbearing age would be re-
quired to behave as if they are pregnant at all times. The only way the
government could enforce such policies would be to monitor women's
sexual activity, menstrual cycles, and daily lifestyles.
The Constitution should protect against such intrusive government
action. Roe v. Wade expressly declares that the fetus is not a person. 7
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,2 8 however, signals the Supreme
Court's recent willingness to weaken Roe. In Webster, the Court upheld
a Missouri statute's declaration that life begins at conception.279 It rea-
soned that the declaration merely expressed a value judgement and did
not actually circumscribe any rights under the Constitution.280 The rest
of the statute, however, severely restricted women's ability to obtain
abortions.281 Since this decision, three Roe supporters have left the
Court and have been replaced by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas,
who appear to be unsupportive of the reasoning and result of Roe. The
Court may soon have an opportunity to revisit the issue of the legal sta-
273. Robertson, supra note 22, at 447 n.129.
274. Shaw, supra note 273, at 83.
275. Professor Shaw proposes legal duties which include monitoring a fetus for defects, and
aborting if any abnormality is present. I at 81.
276. See supra Part I.A.
277. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
278. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
279. I
280. Id at 506-07.
281. Id at 500.
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tus of the fetus in the abortion context. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently upheld Pennsylvania's abortion restrictions, 282 and the
losing party has petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court. If the
Court considers fetal rights superior to women's right to reproductive
autonomy, the new statutes concerning drug use during pregnancy would
be considered constitutional.
Conclusion
States are understandably concerned about the problem of drug-ad-
dicted babies. Unfortunately, states have tried to solve this problem by
turning to punitive, rather than preventative, measures. The new stat-
utes are counterproductive to the goal of helping children. They also
give too much discretion to the state to punish women who do not con-
form to society's idea of the perfect mother. In addition, any increase in
the legal status of the fetus necessarily reduces the rights of women. The
decisions that compel pregnant women to undergo surgery against their
wishes to protect the fetus and the new testing, reporting, and custody
statutes reflect a judicial and legislative trend toward controlling wo-
men's reproductive lives. Unfortunately, the current Supreme Court
may accept this approach as constitutional.
State governments need not ignore their interest in potential life in
order to respect women's constitutional rights. They should acknowl-
edge the special relationship between the pregnant woman and her fetus,
and act in ways that promote the welfare of both. Instead of legislating
pregnant women's behavior, states should invest resources in drug educa-
tion, drug treatment, and prenatal health care. Legislators should pro-
hibit discrimination against pregnant women by drug and alcohol
treatment centers. They should prohibit reporting of test results by hos-
pitals and health care workers so that women will not be deterred from
seeking medical care during pregnancy. Child neglect laws should man-
date in-depth investigation of parental fitness, and provision of services if
necessary, before ordering children's removal from their parents' care.
In addition, states should make a true commitment to the health of ba-
bies through efforts to combat poverty and the lack of health care. These
efforts would effectively protect the welfare of children without sacrific-
ing women's civil liberties.
282. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, No. 90-1662, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24792 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 1991).
